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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Urging that the key provision for bringing' the statute into
operation is the payment of rent, the majority of the court maintained that since defendant had never paid any rent to plaintiff
and the latter was not entitled to any, the defendant was not
entitled to possession and therefore was not a tenant under the
statute. Since the admittedly pro-tenant legislation gives occupants the privilege of remaining in possession and paying rent,
the court felt it would be strange to allow the landlord to impose
upon the occupant the status of a tenant against his will.
The dissenters were of the opinion that an occupant assumed
the status of tenant by electing to remain in possession and that
payment of rent was not essential to being a tenant under the
they felt the tenant must
statute. 28 Having exercised his privilege
29
assume the accompanying burdens.
The view of the majority is sound in the light of the act's
underlying policy to allow tenants to remain in possession without
exhorbitant increases in rent.
Tax Lien Foreclosure-AdversePos'session
Railroad Law, Section 8 (2) gives railroad corporations the
right to acquire property by condemnation but such property
must be used only for the purposes of the corporation during its
existence. This section has been interpreted as giving railroads
only an easement in property which ends when the railroad ceases
operations and abandons the use of the property; the fee holder
having the right to re-enter upon such happening.30 It follows
that the railroad can convey or mortgage no more than an easement.
In a condemnation proceeding instituted by the City of New
York, two claims were made to the award. In 1919 the appellants'
predecessor was the undisputed owner of the land in question
when a railroad condemned it and went into possession. Subsequently the railroad attempted to mortgage the land in fee. In
1935 the railroad stopped using the land. At this point appellants' predecessor had a right to re-enter but did not do so.
Appellants claim the award as her heirs. The respondent as
liquidator of the mortgage company went into possession in 1936
28. See Harlem Savings Bank v. Cooper, 199 Misc. 1110, 101 N.Y. S. 2d 641
(Sup. Ct. 1951) ; Pfalzgraf v. Voso, 184 Misc. 575, 55 N. Y. S. 2d 171 (Sup. Ct. 1945) ;
DaCosta v. Hamilton Republican Club, 187 Misc. 865, 65 N. Y. S. 2d 500 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
29. See Wasservogel v. Meyerowitz, 300 N.Y. 125, 89 N.E. 2d 712 (1949).
30. Miner v. New York Central & H. R. R. Co., 123 N.Y. 242, 25 N. E. 339
(1890); Roby v. New York Central & H. R. R. Co., 142 N.Y. 176, 36 N. E. 1053
(1894) ; Hudson & Manhattan R. R. Co. v. Wendel, 193 N.Y. 166, 85 N.E. 1020 '(1908).
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because the mortgage was in default, and purchased a tax lien on
the property. In 1939 respondent foreclosed on the mortgage and
the tax lien, making appellants' predecessor a party to the action.
Respondent contends he has title by virtue of the foreclosure and
by adverse possession.3 1
The case presents two paramount problems: (1) The possibility of a mortgagee in possession purchasing a tax lien, foreclosing on it and thereby acquiring the fee upon which his
mortgagor's interest was dependent. (2) The degree of notice
necessary to turn possession begun by permission into adverse
possession.
In relation to the first problem, Ten Eyck v. Craig2 points
out that a mortgagee in possession may have a duty to pay taxes
out of the rents and profits of the land. If he fails in this, allows
the land to be sold for taxes, and purchases it himself, he holds
the title in trust for the mortgagor. The majority of the court
felt this had no bearing on the instant case because (a) there were
no profits out of which to pay the taxes or purchase the tax lien
when the city auctioned it off and (b) since the mortgage was
on the easement only, the mortgagee's duty was solely to the
mortgagor and the fee holders were strangers to the agreement.
Furthermore the court concluded, since appellants' claim could
have been raised by their predecessor in the foreclosure proceedings, it is now barred by, ordinary rules of res judicata."
Concerning the second problem, it appears that there are five
essential elements to an effective adverse possession: (1) the
possession must be hostile and under a claim of right, (2) it must
be actual, (3) it must be open and notorious, (4) it must be
exclusive and (5) it must be continuous for a period of fifteen
years. 4
Adverse possession cannot be based on possession or use
under a license or permit from the fee owner, and possession
begun by permission is presumed to so continue until the contrary
appears. 35 Excessive use or violation of a right granted by the
owner cannot create adverse possession until there has been a
repudiation or renouncement of the owner's authority and the
31. In re Harlem River Drive, City of New York, 307 N.Y. 447, 121 N.E. 2d
414 (1954).
32. 62 N.Y. 406 (1875).
33. See Goebel v. Iffla, 111 N.Y. 170, 18 N.E. 649 (1888) ; Schuylkill Fuel Cor.
v. B. & C. Nieberg Realty Corp., 250 N.Y. 304, 165 N.E. 456 (1929).
34. Belotti v. Bickhardt, 228 N. Y. 296, 127 N. E. 239 (1920) ; C. P. A. §§ 35, 37, 39.
35. Lewis v. New York & Harlem R. R. Co., 162 N.Y. 202, 56 N.E. 540 (1900);
Hinkley v. State of New York, 234 N.Y. 309, 137 N.E. 599 (1922).
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possessor thereupon assumes a hostile attitude toward any rights
of the owner.86 The possessor's claim of right may be under a
written instrument or judgment 7 or be unwritten.3 8
The majority of the court maintained that the railroad's easement ended in 1935"9 and that actual notice to the fee holders was
unnecessary. Since the railroad and its successor the respondent
possessed the land until 1952, the statutory requirement of fifteen
years was met and title passed by adverse possession. It was further contended that the respondent himself having occupied the
land from 1936 to 1952 under a mortgage purporting to be on
the fee held adversely to the appellants under a written instrument.
The dissenters sought to resolve the issues in favor of the
appellants. Judge*Desmond conceded that there were no precise
holdings regarding the mortgagee's right to cut off an interest
other than that of his mortgagor but felt that the general rule
of equity imposing a duty on one in possession to protect the
interest of those upon whom his possession depends 40 was applicable to this situation, since the respondent owed a duty to the
railroad which in turn owed a duty to the fee holders. 1
The dissent also insisted that where possession is begun with
permission, there can be no adverse possession without giving
and that this rule is
direct notice of the hostile claim to the4 owner,
2
applied throughout the United States.
B. PersonalProperty
Lost Trust Certificate
Plaintiffs represented a stock exchange firm which acquired
five certificates of 100 shares each in a land trust in 1888. Four
of the certificates were indorsed for transfer and had been presented for transfer on the books of the land trust, but the fifth
one was never presented. Plaintiffs contended that it was lost
36. Ibid.
37. C. P.A. § 37.
38. C. P. A. § 39.
39. See Heard v. City of Brooklyn, 60 N.Y. 242 (1875) ; see also Miner v. New
York Central & H. R. R. Co.; Roby v. New York Central & H. R. R. Co., supranote 30.
40. Cf. Burhans v. Van Zandt, 7 N.Y. 523 (1852); Ten Eyck v. Craig, supra
note 32; Van Duzer v. Anderson, 306 N.Y. 707, 117 N.E. 2d 805 (1954).
41. See Becker v. McCrea, 193 N.Y. 423, 86 N.E. 463 (1908).
42. See City of New York v. Coney Island Fire Dept., 259 App. Div. 286, 18
N.Y. S. 2d 923 (2d Dep't 1940), aff'd, 285 N.Y. 535, 32 N.E. 2d 827 (1941) ; Branch v.
Central Trust Co., 320 Ill. 432, 151 N.E. 284 (1926); City of Grand Rapids v. Pere
Marquette Ry. Co., 248 Mich. 686, 227 N. W. 797 (1929).
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